Tagged: GDP GROWTH

Right and Wrong about Inflation

For more than a year the European economy has been in deflation territory. To reverse that trend the European Central Bank launched its Quantitative Easing program, aimed at flooding the euro zone with liquidity. According to crude monetary theory this will drive up prices in line with the so called quantity theory of money; few if any central bankers would admit that their take on money supply and inflation is this simple, but the only other explanation is so far-fetched that even the quantity theory of money makes sense.

The alternative theory says that the reason why businesses are not investing in Europe is that there is not enough cheap risk capital available in the economy. For this theory to work, though, the cost of borrowing that businesses face would have to have been exceptionally high during the recession. In fact, the exact opposite is true: since the Great Recession started the composite cost of borrowing for non-financial corporations in the euro zone has been in the 2-4 percent bracket. Right before the recession it topped out above ten percent.

In other words, the has been an abundance of liquidity available for anyone and everyone willing – and qualified – to borrow.

But if your business outlook says flat sales, at best, you are not going to take on new loans. And flat sales or worse has been the forecast story for European businesses for six years now.

What does this have to do with inflation? Well, low economic activity means low demand and low utilization of productive capacity. As a result, there is no upward pressure on prices and therefore no real-sector inflation in the economy. Whatever inflation may be looming in the near European future has a monetary origin.

Does this mean that the primitive quantity theory of money is correct? No, it does not. The quantity theory rests on a rigid structure of assumptions regarding the operation of a free market, both in terms of the flexibility of real-sector resources and of free-market prices. The most confounding part of the quantity theory of money is that the economy axiomatically always reverts back to full employment; then, and only then, can monetary inflation occur.

Europe is about to line up with several other countries proving that monetary inflation is just as possible – if not more possible – in a stagnant economy. In fact, when stagnation and low capacity utilization is combined with monetary inflation, there is a macroeconomic venom brewing. The worst response to this situation is one where key decision makers assume that the monetary inflation they see is actually real-sector inflation.

Somewhat surprisingly, that mistake is made by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, who is without a doubt Europe’s best political commentator. But in his latest column in The Telegraph, Mr. Evans-Pritchard allows his otherwise astute analytical abilities to lead him astray:

Be thankful for small mercies. The world economy is no longer in a liquidity trap. The slide into deflation has, for now, run its course. The broad M3 money supply in the US has been soaring at an annual rate of 8.2pc over the past six months, harbinger of a reflationary boomlet by year’s end. Europe is catching up fast. A dynamic measure of eurozone M3 known as Divisia – tracked by the Bruegel Institute in Brussels – is back to growth levels last seen in 2007.

But GDP growth, business investments, employment and capacity utilization are far from 2007 levels. While inflation back then was a real-sector phenomenon, it is not founded in real-sector activity today.

And that should have us all worried. Evans-Pritchard included:

History may judge that the European Central Bank launched quantitative easing when the cycle was already turning, but Italy’s debt trajectory needs all the help it can get. The full force of monetary expansion – not to be confused with liquidity, which can move in the opposite direction – will kick in just as the one-off effects of cheap oil are washed out of the price data.

I know Mr. Evans-Pritchard is British, but that does not mean he has to entertain an erstwhile concept of liquidity. Just a small comment. Back to his column, where his discussion of inflation is taking a somewhat odd turn:

Inflation will soon be flirting with 2pc across the Atlantic world. Within a year, the global economic landscape will look entirely different, with an emphasis on the word “look”. In my view this will prove to be mini-cyclical in a world of “secular stagnation” and deficient demand, but mini-cycles can be powerful. Mr Stein said total loans in the US are now growing at a faster rate (six-month annualised) than during the five-year build-up to the Lehman crisis.

Again, all macroeconomic indicators point to a continuation of a ho-hum recovery here in the United States, the March GDP numbers notwithstanding. At the same time, practically nothing says that Europe will enjoy anything near a U.S. growth period any time soon. Therefore, it is wrong to compare the inflation rates in Europe and the United States as if they are apples and apples. They are not. Our inflation here in the United States is the result of a steady rise in economic activity, a tightening of available capacity in infrastructure and other capital stock and even a glimpse of labor shortage in some sectors.

In other words, traditional causes of inflation. Europe, on the other hand, still suffers from almost twice the unemployment rate, with GDP growth at half or less the rate of ours. To really drive home the point about Europe’s abundant, idling economic resources, let us once again repeat the point that the cost of borrowing for non-financial corporations is down to 2-4 percent (after topping 10 percent before the Great Recession).

There is in other words no demand-driven push on prices to rise in Europe. This means monetary inflation, and there is an abundance of evidence from the past century on just how destructive and unstable such inflation can be.

Mr. Evans-Pritchard does not see this. Instead, he is worried about monetary tightening in the United States and its possible global effects:

“The risk is that the Fed will have to raise rates much more quickly than the markets expect. This is what happened in 1994,” he said. That episode set off a bond rout. Yields on 10-year US Treasuries rose 260 basis points over 15 months, resetting the global price of money. It detonated Mexico’s Tequila crisis. Bonds are even more vulnerable to a reflation shock today. You need a very strong nerve to buy German 10-year Bunds at the current yield of 0.16pc, or French bonds at 0.43pc, at time when EMU money data no longer look remotely “Japanese”.

Just one second here… No longer remotely “Japanese”? GDP growth for 2014 in the euro zone (19 countries) was 0.89 percent, and 1.3 percent in the EU as a whole. How is that not “Japanese” data??

Yet on some points Mr. Evans-Pritchard does see the underlying real-sector dimension of the inflation issue:

[The U.S. labor market] is turning. The quit rate – a gauge of willingness to look for a better job – is nearing 2pc, the level when employers must build pay-moats to keep workers. It is true that the US economy gave a good imitation of hitting a brick wall in the first quarter. Retail sales have fallen for three months, the worst drop since 2009. The Atlanta Fed’s snap indicator – GDPNow – suggests that growth dropped to stall speed in March. The rise in non-farm payrolls slumped 126,000 in March, half expectations. Yet economies do not fall out of sky. The US has already survived the biggest fiscal squeeze since demobilisation after the Korean War without falling into recession.

And again, some sectors and states are already in tight labor supply. Try hire a Hooters waitress for less than $15/hr in North Dakota. Some trucking companies are pushing annual driver compensation north of $70,000.

But perhaps the problem, at the end of the day, is that analysts and commentators focus on too many variables at the same time. You can certainly look at the economy from an almost infinite number of angles and get different stories out of each one of them, but in reality some angles only show symptoms while others capture the causes. Mr. Evans-Pritchard stretches his analysis a bit thin, going into asset prices and a roster of secondary data, elevating those numbers to the same prominence as – actually higher prominence than – real-sector growth data.

In reality, asset prices depend on real-sector growth data; tainted by speculative expectations, they only give an imperfect image of where the economy is really heading.

When we look at the European and American economies from the angle of real-sector activity, we do again see the gaping difference between a growth, moderately healthy United States and a stagnant, industrially poor Europe. The former has a sound form of inflation on its way; the latter is experiencing the beginning of a dangerous episode of monetary inflation.

That said, I still recommend you all to keep reading Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. He is intelligent and thorough and he has no problem presenting unpopular views if he believes they are merited.

Europe’s Structural Deficit Problem

In my book Industrial Poverty I diagnose the European economic crisis as being a permanent state of economic stagnation, caused by a fiscally unsustainable welfare state. The deficits that plague the continent’s welfare states are caused by a structural imbalance between tax revenue growth and growth in government spending. In other words, the deficits that the EU-IMF-ECB troika and member-state governments have been fighting so hard over the past 5-6 years are actually in large part structural.

As I explain in this paper, you cannot fight structural deficits with business-cycle policy measures. That is what the Europeans have tried to do for half a decade now, to no avail. In fact, their problems have only gotten worse, with no recovery in sight.

Today I am happy to report on yet another depressing angle of the crisis. A structural budget deficit is a deficit that a government cannot pay for over a long period of time. While there is no set-in-stone definition of a structural deficit, the conventional definition has been that it is the deficit that remains when the economy is operating at full employment. However, the definition of full employment changes over time; what was considered serious unemployment in the 1980s is now acceptable as full employment in many countries. With that change, obviously the definition of the structural deficit would change as well, even though government has done nothing to reduce the deficit.

A better definition of a structural deficit is one that still rises above the regular business cycle but at the same time is independent of the level of employment. In the aforementioned paper I suggested a definition based on, at minimum, ten years of economic performance: a ten-year long trend in government spending (or a specific share thereof) is compared to a ten-year long trend in tax-base growth. If spending outgrows the tax base, then the government is having to deal with a structural deficit; if the tax base grows faster than spending, then there is a structural surplus in the government budget.

To get a good idea of whether or not Europe has a structural-deficit problem, I pulled the following numbers from the Eurostat database:

Government spending defined as welfare-state spending: housing and community development; health; culture, religion and recreation; education; and social protection; and

Current-price and inflation-adjusted growth in GDP.

Not all member states report these numbers down to the level needed for a ten-year trend study; in addition to 13 EU member states I also pulled data for Norway, which turned out to be interesting.

The results are as follows (time period 2004-2013). A ratio of 100 means a perfect growth balance where welfare-state spending is growing on par with the tax base; an index number below 100 is a structural deficit while an index number higher than 100 represents a structural surplus. For current-price GDP, four of the 14 countries actually run a surplus:

CURRENT PRICE STRUCTURAL
Poland 120.5
Norway 116.2
Sweden 108.3
Czech Republic 100.3
Austria 97.5
Estonia 90.8
Luxembourg 82.8
Belgium 72.9
Cyprus 72.5
France 70.3
Netherlands 63.4
Finland 61.3
Italy 53.5
Portugal 53.0

While the Polish government’s broadest possible tax base is growing by 120.5 euros per 100 euros of welfare-state spending, the Portuguese tax base only grows by 53 cents per euro of growth in welfare-state spending.

This indicates structural deficits in ten of these 14 countries. It does not mean that there is an actual deficit of this magnitude, but it means that the economy of these ten countries is unable to sustain the spending that goes out through their entitlement programs.

But that aside, it looks kind of good, doesn’t it, to have such a prominent welfare state as Sweden in the structural surplus category. Does that not mean that the welfare state can be paid for?

Let us answer that question with a look at the same spending numbers, but now compared to inflation-adjusted GDP:

REAL GROWTH STRUCTURAL
Poland 61.8
Sweden 47.9
Austria 44.5
Czech Republic 39.1
Luxembourg 35.4
Estonia 33.6
France 29.8
Belgium 29.2
Netherlands 29.2
Cyprus 25.9
Norway 25.4
Finland 23.1
Portugal -2.4
Italy -9.6

All of a sudden, Poland can only pay for 61.8 cents of every euro they spend on welfare-state programs. Sweden cannot pay for half of its welfare state. But worst of all: welfare-state spending in Portugal and Italy is so structurally under-funded that it outgrows the tax base by more than a euro, per euro in increased spending!

This means, in a nutshell, that the Portuguese and Italian governments draw taxes from a shrinking tax base to pay for what is undoubtedly an out-of-control welfare state.

Even if the actual growth of their tax revenues does not track the growth of GDP at all times, the GDP growth rate provides the most comprehensive picture of what the economy – and thereby taxpayers – could afford in terms of welfare-state spending. The bottom line for today, therefore, is that governments of welfare states from all corners of Europe are lucky if they see their tax revenues grow half as fast as their spending. And that is regardless of where the business cycle is: again, these numbers cover the period from 2004 through 2013.

Growth and Deficits in Europe

As the Germans, the Greeks and the European Union leadership try to hash out a reasonable plan for Greece to secede from the currency union, the underlying question remains: has Europe managed to deal with the structural problems that brought many of its member states to their fiscal knees?

More specifically: are the problems that have sent Greece into a depression and possibly out of the euro zone unique to Greece – or are they just more concentrated there than elsewhere in Europe?

The answer to this question, presented in my book Industrial Poverty, is that the Greek crisis is merely a concentrate of an endemic European problem: a welfare state that is structurally and permanently too costly for the private sector to pay for. So long as the Europeans keep their welfare state they will continue to dwell in economic stagnation, with chronic problems of growth and budget deficits.

Over the past year countless forecasts of a strong recovery – or even a moderate recovery – in the European economy have been proven wrong. There are two reasons for this: economists normally rely on econometrics when they make their forecasts, a methodology that is not well tuned for large institutional and structural problems in the economy; and the focus on – obsession with – econometrics leads economists to ignore long-term structural trends in the economy.

Europe’s crisis is a structural one, caused by a long trend of weakening growth and increasingly persistent budget deficits. The over-arching problem, again, is the structure of entitlements imposed on the economy by the welfare state, a fact that is visible in the following, rather compelling data.

Figure 1 reports data on GDP growth and government deficits as share of GDP. The data is from 12 European welfare states, selected first and foremost based on data availability. The 12 states are then observed over a period of 48 quarters, fourth quarter of 2002 through third quarter of 2014, for annual, inflation-adjusted GDP growth and the deficit-GDP ratio. The result is a clearly visible correlation between the deficit ratio and GDP growth:

GDPdeficit12Wstates2

.

The better the deficit-to-GDP ratio, the stronger is GDP growth.

Now, let’s not rush to conclusions here. The immediate reaction among crude Austrians and crude Keynesians would be, respectively:

  • “Yes, this proves that austerity is king!”
  • “No, this can’t be – everybody knows that deficit spending is king!”

Truth is, neither side is correct. The reason why budget surpluses, or small deficits, correlate with high growth and deficits with slow or no growth, is as simple as it is independent of political-economic theory. Put simply, modern, mature welfare states are so big and difficult to pay for that a budget deficit is the normal state of affairs. Since the welfare state also depresses growth, by means of high taxes and sloth-inducing entitlements, it creates a combination of deficits and low growth.

Under unusual circumstances, high growth combines with surpluses not because government spending is low, but because GDP growth is high. In other words, observations of surpluses in Figure 1 are due entirely to a fortunate period of strong growth.

To further reinforce the point that growth is the only way to a reduced deficit in modern welfare states, consider Figure 2:

GDPdeficit12Wstates3

Note how the deficit-to-GDP ratio improves from 2005-2006. The reason is an improvement in GDP growth that started already in 2003. Next, note how GDP growth stagnates and starts declining in 2007 and how the deficit ratio follows downward in 2008. The upturn in the deficit ratio does not come until 2010, a year after GDP started improving.

In a nutshell: it is growth, not austerity, that fixes European budgets. (The same holds true, obviously, for the United States as well.) In absence of growth the budget deficits overwhelm their host economies and pile up more and more unsustainable debt.

Euro-Dollar Parity, Part 2

Earlier this week I summed up some recent observations of macroeconomic differences between the United States and Europe. Those differences, which explain why the euro has plunged from $1.39 in May last year to its current $1.06, are not going to go away any time soon. I recently did an overview of the fundamentals that constitute the strength of the U.S. economy (see part 1, part 2, part 3 and part 4); today’s article takes a closer look at the European economy.*

As the latest national-accounts data from Eurostat reports, the European economy remains in a state of de facto stagnation. According to inflation-adjusted numbers, GDP growth for 2014 stood at 1.3 percent; while much better than 0.04 percent for 2013, a closer examination shows that it is neither impressive nor sustainable.

Unlike the growth in the U.S. economy, which originates in sustained growth of domestic, private-sector activity, Europe’s increase in growth is driven primarily by exports. In 2013 exports from the European Union grew by 2.16 percent in inflation-adjusted numbers, a number that increased to 3.53 percent in 2014.

There is a sharp contrast between these growth numbers and those for private consumption: -0.1 percent in 2013 turned into growth of 1.29 percent in 2014, hardly an impressive number.

To further emphasize the role of exports for Europe, consider the strong correlation between exports and business investments, vs. the apparent absence of consumption-investment correlation:

EU C I X

Since private consumption barely moves, businesses have no reason to invest for the domestic market. They therefore tailor their business expansions – to the extent such expansions take place – to fluctuations in foreign markets.

The dependency on exports is even more apparent at the member-state level. Over the past two years, exports has been the leading absorption variable in 17 of the 26 countries included here (Ireland and Luxembourg have not yet reported fourth-quarter data). In five of the countries exports was the only absorption category that shows any growth; in Spain private consumption barely squeezed into positive territory:

Consumption Investm. Govt cons. Exports GDP avg
Greece -0.31% -3.45% -3.61% 5.37% -1.59%
Croatia -0.94% -2.55% -0.67% 4.86% -0.68%
Netherlands -0.74% -0.76% -0.15% 2.99% 0.03%
Italy -1.24% -4.58% -0.60% 1.57% -1.06%
Cyprus -2.80% -18.00% -6.54% 0.39% -3.81%
Spain 0.09% -0.21% -1.41% 4.24% 0.07%

The long-term trend of growing dependency on exports is visible across the board in the EU. From 2011 to 2014 (4th quarters), exports share of GDP increased in 23 of the 26 member states included here.

While there is nothing wrong inherently with growing exports, there is a problem when an economy almost entirely depends on exports. Contrary to prevailing wisdom among, primarily, European economists there is no lasting positive “multiplier” effect from exports to the rest of the economy – except, as mentioned, the business investments that relate specifically to exports.

The lack of positive multiplier effects from exports to, e.g., private consumption is reinforced by the fact that government spending is the strongest or second-strongest growth variable in 15 of the 26 countries. This is remarkable: for all of EU-28 government absorption grew at an annual rate of 0.6 percent per year over the 2013-2014 eight quarters. The fact that this was enough to finish second speaks volumes to the overall weakness of the European economy.

So long as this weakness remains, there will be no reversal of the long-term decline of EU economy.

*) Eurostat, 2005 chain-linked national accounts data.

State of the U.S. Economy, Part 4

In the first three installments of this series we looked at the aggregate-demand side of the U.S. economy. The overall message is that the economy is in pretty good shape, given the circumstances: the private-sector share of the economy has grown over the past 15 years, consumers buy more durables (such as cars) while maintaing a steady overall level of indebtedness; business investments are increasingly stable at a high rate – and government consumption and investment spending has been declining for a couple of years.

There is no doubt that the economy could do better. In the past three years GDP has been growing at 2.1-2.4 percent per year, adjusted for inflation; a good growth rate this far out of a recession would be 3-3.5 percent. There are two reasons why we are not seeing more growth than we do:

  • In the short run, the federal debt and the Obama administration’s affinity for regulations have put a damper on private-sector activity;
  • In the long run, the U.S. economy is in the same early stages of industrial poverty that Europe experienced some 20-25 years ago.

Nevertheless, the economy is growing and so is the private sector. This fourth and last installment takes a closer look at the production side of the economy, asking the question: what industries produce the value that adds up to our Gross Domestic Product?

The first thing we note about the value-added analysis of GDP is that the American economy is remarkably stable from a structural viewpoint. The industries that were the backbone of the economy ten years ago remain its backbone today. In 2005,

  • The financial industry produced 23.2 percent of the value added in the economy;
  • Manufacturing came in second at 15.1 percent;
  • Professional and business services contributed 12.7 percent.

Together, these three industries added $5.67 trillion to the economy (in current prices), or 44.2 percent of the entire GDP.

In 2014, the same three sectors, again topping the ranking in the same order, produced a total value of $7.83 trillion, representing almost exactly the same share of GDP.

This is a sign of structural stability, and it is worth noting that manufacturing – the death of which is so often declared – continues to grow. From 2005 (the earliest year with consistent value-added GDP data) through the third quarter of 2014, American manufacturing grew by an average of 2.4 percent per year (again in current prices). Admittedly, this is not exceptional; most other industries have seen stronger growth. But it is a higher growth rate than, e.g., manufacturing in Europe.

If we look at value-added per employee, manufacturing looks even better. For the same 2005-2014 period, per-employee value added grew by 4.2 percent per year:

  • In 2005 the average manufacturing worker produced a total value of $119,800;
  • In 2009, right in the middle of the Great Recession, he produced a total value of $145,900; and
  • In 2014 (annual value based on the first three quarters) the value added per employee was $171,200.

The number of employees in manufacturing has gone down over the past ten years, from 14.2 million in 2005 to 12.2 million last year. On the upside, there are 700,000 more manufacturing workers in America today than there was in 2009 and 2010, the bottom of the Great Recession.

In other words, manufacturing is on the rebound in America.

The leading industry of our economy, the financial sector, is even healthier – at least judging from the value it produces. (Let us keep in mind that this is the market value of their services, not the investments they make.) Per employee, the financial sector produced a value of…

  • $322,200 in 2005;
  • $366,700 in 2009; and
  • $440,200 in 2014.

During the same period of time, the financial industry has increased its value added to GDP by $1 trillion in current prices, from $2.5 trillion in 2005 to $3.5 trillion in 2014.

On the job-creation side, though, the financial industry seems to suffer from the same reluctance that is holding  back manufacturing. In 2005 there were almost 8.2 million people working in the financial industry; in 2014 that same number was 147,000 people lower. That said, since its recession bottom of 7,678,000 employees the industry has regained 318,000 jobs.

There is one more sector that deserves a note. Of all the major industries, mining produces the highest per-employee value: $528,000 in 2014. Furthermore, with a value-added increase of more than ten percent per year and a job growth of 4.2 percent annually, mining strongly contributes to our economic recovery.

To sum up, there is growth almost in every corner of our economy. It is a ho-hum recovery, but it remains relatively steady and it has no doubt replaced the recession as the “norm” of the economy. This is good, but things can get better. While it is unrealistic to expect stellar growth rates for the United States when both China, Europe and Japan are in recession mode, at the very least we can squeeze another percent in annual growth out of the economy.

How could we that happen? Well, that is the question for another day. For now, relax and enjoy the ride.

State of the U.S. Economy, Part 2

Yesterday I reported some data showing that the U.S. economy is in good shape from a structural viewpoint. Household spending and business investments – domestic private-sector activity – today absorb a larger share of output than they did under the Bush Jr. administration. Government consumption and investment spending has taken a step back, and the foreign trade balance is in better shape today than at the height of the Bush business cycle.

Today, let’s look at the same macroeconomic data from another perspective.

2. A strong growth pattern

Untitled

In terms of inflation-adjusted growth, the U.S. economy is doing relatively well. GDP growht is not great – but these numbers from 2009-2014 are far better than what we can find anywhere in the developed world:

  • 2009 -2.76 percent
  • 2010 2.53 percent
  • 2011 1.6 percent
  • 2012 2.32 percent
  • 2013 2.09 percent
  • 2014 2.41 percent

When an economy grows faster than two percent per year it provides opportunities for people to achieve a standard of living higher than what previous generations have accomplished. Growth below causes stagnation or even a decline in the average standard of living.* From this perspective the American economy is just about keeping its nose above the water. It could do much better, but two factors are holding us back: the Obama administration’s affinity for heavy-handed regulations, and the combined global effects of a China in recession, a Europe in stagnation and a Russia in Ukraine.

In other words, as the sole engine pulling the industrialized world forward, the United States is doing a reasonably good job. More details from the GDP growth numbers reinforce this conclusion. There is, e.g., private consumption which over the past three years has averaged 2.1 percent in annual growth. For 2014, though, the preliminary growth rate was 2.5 percent, a good but not excellent number. Underneath it, though, is some good news: spending on durable goods – household appliances, automobiles etc – has averaged 6.5 percent per year since 2012. This means two things: American families are improving their credit scores again after taking a beating in the trough of the Great Recession; and they are more optimistic about the future.

This optimism is corroborated by encouraging employment, which we will get to in the fourth and last part of this series.

But there is even more good news in the GDP growth numbers. Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF or business investments) has averaged a growth rate of 5.7 percent per year over the past three years. Even better: the growth rate is stabilizing. In the figure above, investments fluctuate wildly:

  • Down 26.4 percent in Q2 of 2009;
  • Up 21.1 percent in Q3 od 2010;
  • Growth plummets to 1.3 percent in Q3 2011;
  • Next growth peak is 13.5 percentin Q1 2012.

From thereon the amplitude declines, forming a “confidence cone” where the annual rate stabilizes around 5.7 percent per year. A good number, the stability of which makes it even more impressive.

At the same time, no story of capital formation is complete without a detailed look at what kinds of investments businesses make. Here, again, there is an encouraging pattern of stability. Fixed investment falls into two categories, non-residential and residential, with the former constituting about 80 percent of total fixed investment. In this group spending is divided into structures, equipment and intellectual property products. Again the proportions between the different categories remain stable over time, with the equipment category representing 45-47 percent of non-residential investments.

While homes construction was weak in 2014 – growing by only 1.64 percent – it finished strongly in the fourth quarter at 2.6 percent over Q4 2013. But the residential investment numbers for 2012 and 2013 were downright impressive: 13.5 and 12 percent, respectively.

Finally, a word about government spending. Many people unfamiliar with national accounts make the mistake of looking at total government outlays as share of GDP, whereupon they understandably get outraged about how big government is. However, in order to understand the role of government properly one has to remove the financial transactions from government spending: GDP only consists of payments for work – by labor or capital – or for products. A financial transaction such as a cash entitlement does not pay for work or products, and therefore has no place in GDP.

The government spending included in GDP is payments for teachers in public school, police officers and tax collectors, as well as products such as tasty lunches for middle-school kids and gasoline for the presidential motorcade. It is also investments such as new highways and faster trucks for the postal service.

This kind of government spending has actually been shrinking in the past few years:

  • 2011 -3.04 percent;
  • 2012 -1.45 percent;
  • 2013 -1.49 percent; and
  • 2014 -0.18 percent.

All in all, then, the U.S. economy is in reasonably good shape. This does not mean that cash entitlements such as food stamps are not a problem. They are. But with this stable macroeconomic foundation the U.S. economy is well suited to handle reforms to entitlement programs.

Check back after the weekend for the two remaining installments in this series.

—–

* The two-percent mark is arrived at through an adaptation of Okun’s Law. See:

Larson, Sven: Industrial Poverty – Yesterday Sweden, Today Europe, Tomorrow America; Gower Applied Research, London, UK 2014.

European GDP Disappoints Again

After a delay with its national accounts publications, Eurostat has now caught up. Fourth-quarter numbers are beginning to sip out, with the following press release last Friday:

Seasonally adjusted GDP rose by 0.3% in the euro area (EA18) and by 0.4% in the EU28 during the fourth quarter of 2014, compared with the previous quarter, according to flash estimates published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. In the third quarter of 2014, GDP grew by 0.2% in the euro area and by 0.3% in the EU28.

More important, though, is the annual growth rate:

Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, seasonally adjusted GDP rose by 0.9% in the euro area and by 1.3% in the EU28 in the fourth quarter of 2014, after +0.8% and +1.3% respectively in the previous quarter. During the fourth quarter of 2014, GDP in the United States increased by … 2.5% (after +2.7% in the previous quarter).

The U.S. economy is still way ahead of Europe, and there are no signs of this parity shrinking. For the three countries where Eurostat has reported individual 2014 GDP numbers, inflation-adjusted growth rates are far from impressive:

  • Germany: 1.61 percent;
  • France: 0.38 percent;
  • Greece: 0.87 percent.

For the two largest economies in the euro zone, Germany and France, the combined growth rate is 1.08 percent. That is a minuscule uptick over the second and third quarter annual growth rates of 0.99 and 1.02 percent, respectively. Furthermore, while the combined growth rate for Germany and France is slowly increasing, the individual growth rates for the two countries are going in different directions. Again, annual inflation-adjusted growth rates reported by quarter:

2014Q2 2014Q3 2014Q4
Germany 1.33% 1.45% 1.61%
France 0.54% 0.44% 0.38%

Frustrating comments are already pouring out over the internet. EUbusiness.co. says that the numbers are “too weak to convincingly signal a full-blown recovery”. They are absolutely right. Analysts quoted by EUbusiness.com attribute the slight uptick in growth to falling oil prices and a weaker euro. Both of these are external factors, which means that Europe still has no core growth power. It is also important to remember that the weak euro partly is attributable to concerns about the future of the currency. With Greece basically in open defiance of payment obligations and EU-imposed austerity programs, and with countries like Portugal and Italy likely to join Greece should Athens decide to secede from the currency union, there are complicated, long-term reasons for a weak euro.

One analyst suggests to EUbusiness.com that the fact that the ECB has basically eliminated interest rates is adding so much to the picture that it is time to talk about a European recovery:

The ECB’s version of so-called quantitative easing has already decreased government borrowing prices across most of the currency bloc and weakened the euro, which should help to boost exports in Europe. “For the first time in two years, we can say that the region is going for solid growth,” Anna Maria Grimaldi, an economist at Intesa Sanpaolo SpA in Milan, told Bloomberg News. “The euro area is supported by the very strong tailwinds of the fall of the euro, the fall of oil prices and the fall of interest rates sparked by ECB QE.”

However, as I explained last week, the zeroing of interest rates has at best led to a temporary boost in business investments. There are no signs of a permanent recovery.

I will repeat this ad nauseam: unlike the American economy, the European economy has no reason to recover.

EU Economic Standstill in Details

Today it is time to review in more detail the latest national accounts data from Eurostat. A disaggregation of the spending side of GDP reinforces my long-standing statement: the European economy is in a state of long-term stagnation.

To the numbers. We begin with private consumption, which is the driving force of all economic activity. It is not only a national-accounts category, but an indicator of how free and prosperous private citizens are to satisfy their own needs on their own terms. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic freedom that private consumption is the dominant absorption category.

Once consumer spending starts ticking up solidly, we can safely say there is a recovery under way. However, little is happening on the consumption front: over the past eight quarters (ending with Q3 2014) the private-consumption growth rate for the EU has been 0.3 percent per year. While the increase was stronger in 2014 than in 2013, only half of the EU member states experienced a growth in consumer spending of two percent or more in the last year. The three largest euro-zone countries, Germany, France and Italy, were all at 1.2 percent or less.

One bright spot in the consumption data: Greece, Spain and Portugal, the three member states that have been hit the hardest by statist austerity, now have an annual consumption growth rate well above 2.5 percent. Portugal has been above two percent for three quarters in a row; a closer look at these three countries is merited.

Overall, though, the statist-austerity policies during the Great Recession have caused a structural shift in the European economy that may be hard to reverse. From having been a consumer-based economy with strong exports, the EU has now basically been transformed into an exports-driven economy. On average, gross exports is larger as share of GDP than private consumption.

In theory, one could argue that this is a sign of free-market trade where people and businesses choose to buy what they want and need from abroad instead. I would be inclined to agree – but only in theory. In practice, if households and businesses freely made their choices on a global market, then rising exports would correlate with rising imports and, most importantly, rising private consumption. However, that is not the case in Europe. On average for the 28 EU member states,

  • Exports has increased from an unweighted average of 59 percent of GDP in 2007 to an unweighted average of 70 percent in 2014;
  • Net exports has also increases, from zero in 2007 (indicating trade balance) to six percent of GDP in 2014 (indicating a massive trade surplus).

If the rising exports had been a sign of increased participation in global trade on free-market terms, then either of two things would have happened: consumption would have increased as share of GDP or imports would have increased on par with exports. In reality, neither has happened, which leads to one of two conclusions:

  1. There has been a massive increase in corporate investments, which if true would indicate growing confidence in the future among Europe’s businesses; or
  2. Exports is the only category of the economy that is allowed to grow because it is not subject to the tight spending restrictions imposed by austerity.

Gross fixed capital formation, or “investments” as it is often casually referred to, was an unweighted average of 26 percent in the EU member states in 2007. Seven years later it had fallen to 21 percent. This is clearly a vote of no confidence from corporate Europe. Therefore, only one explanation remains: the discrepancy between on the one hand the rise in gross and net exports and, on the other hand, stagnant private consumption and a declining investment share, is the result of a fiscal policy driven by statist austerity.

The purpose of fiscal policy in Europe since at least the beginning of the Great Recession has been to balance the government budget at any cost. If this statist austerity leads to a painful decline in household consumption or corporate investments, then so be it. As shown by the numbers reported here, years of statist austerity have depressed corporate activity. In fixed prices, gross fixed capital formation in the EU has not increased since 2011:

  • In the third quarter of 2011 businesses invested for 607.8 billion euros;
  • In the third quarter of 2014 they invested for 602 billion euros.

The bottom line here is that the only form of economic activity that brings any kind of growth to the European economy is – you guessed it – exports. But it is not just any exports. It is exports outside of the EU. How do we know that? Because of the following two tables. First, the average annual private-consumption growth rate, reported quarterly, for the past eight quarters (ending Q3 2014):

Private consumption growth
Lithuania 4.4% France 0.2%
Latvia 4.3% Denmark 0.0%
Estonia 4.0% Ireland -0.2%
Romania 2.2% Bulgaria -0.2%
Sweden 2.1% Austria -0.3%
Malta 2.0% Finland -0.4%
United Kingdom 1.7% Portugal -0.5%
Poland 1.7% Spain -0.8%
Luxembourg 1.6% Netherlands -1.1%
Germany 0.8% Greece -1.4%
Hungary 0.6% Croatia -1.5%
Belgium 0.5% Italy -1.8%
Czech Republic 0.4% Slovenia -2.1%
Slovakia 0.3% Cyprus -3.5%

With private consumption growing at less than one percent in 19 out of 28 countries, households in the EU do not form a good market for foreign exporters.

Things a not really better in the category of business investments:

Gross fixed capital formation
Ireland 7.5% Latvia -0.2%
Hungary 7.4% Slovakia -0.9%
Lithuania 6.4% France -1.1%
Malta 5.1% Czech Republic -1.5%
United Kingdom 4.5% Netherlands -1.7%
Poland 3.3% Spain -2.1%
Slovenia 2.0% Croatia -2.5%
Sweden 1.7% Luxembourg -2.5%
Estonia 1.7% Portugal -3.7%
Denmark 1.4% Italy -4.5%
Germany 0.9% Finland -5.2%
Bulgaria 0.5% Romania -6.0%
Belgium -0.1% Greece -7.3%
Austria -0.1% Cyprus -14.3%

What this means, in plain English, is that the European economy still is not pulling itself out of its recession.

But is it not possible that things have changed recently? After all, the time series analyzed here end with the third quarter of 2014. There is always that possibility, but one indication that the answer is negative is the latest report on euro-zone inflation. From EU Business:

Eurozone consumer prices fell by a record 0.6 percent in January, EU data showed Friday, confirming deflation could be taking hold and putting pressure on a historic bond-buying plan by the ECB to deliver. The drop from minus 0.2 percent in December appears to back the European Central Bank’s decision last week to launch a bond-buying spree to drive up prices. Plummeting world oil prices were largely to blame for the fall in the 19-country eurozone, already beset by weak economic growth and high unemployment, the EU’s data agency Eurostat said.

If the EU governments let declining oil prices trickle down to consumers – and avoid raising taxes in response – there could be a positive reaction in private consumption. However, lower gasoline and home heating costs will not be enough to turn around the European economy.

More on that later, though. For now, the conclusion is that Europe is going nowhere.

Weak Growth – No Recovery

Recently Eurostat released national accounts data for the third quarter of 2014. Here is a review of those numbers in the context of historical GDP data. All growth rates are in 2005 chained prices.

First, the growth rates of 28-member EY and 18-member euro zone:

EU EURO

The real annual growth rate of the EU-28 GDP is 1.51 percent, compared to 1.34 percent in Q2 of 2014 and 1.61 percent in Q1. Euro-zone growth is markedly lower – for first, second and third quarters of last year, respectively: 1.08, 0.65 and 0.79 percent. The difference between the euro zone and the EU-28 is primarily the work of a recovery in the British economy. In the three quarters of 2014, Britain saw its GDP growth at 1.8, 3.6 and 3.2 percent, respectively. If we subtract the U.K. economy from the EU-28 GDP, the European growth rates for 2014 fall to (with actual rates in parentheses) 1.58 (1.61), 0.89 (1.34) and 1.17 (1.51) percent. A distinct difference, in other words.

As the aforementioned numbers report, there is not much to be joyful of inside the euro zone. There are member states with strong growth, but they tend to be of marginal importance for the entire zone. In the third quarter of 2014 the strongest-growing euro-zone countries were Luxembourg (3.99 percent over Q3 2013), Malta (3.82) and Ireland (3.54). By contrast, the three largest euro economies have a tough time growing at all: Germany (1.24 percent over Q3 2013) and France (0.24) kept their nose above water, while third-largest Italy saw its GDP decline by half a percent.

Here is the growth history of the three largest euro-zone economies:

Italy France Germany

We will have to wait and see what the new Greek government will do to the future of the euro and the confidence of private-sector agents in the European economy. With Syriza teaming up with a distinctly nationalist party, the message out of Athens could not be stronger: Greece is off on a new course, and it won’t be with the best interests of the euro zone in mind.

There is a lot more to be said about these GDP numbers. It will be very interesting to look at what sectors are driving whatever growth there is – and which ones are contracting. I suspect that exports will play a larger role than domestic demand. Hopefully I am wrong, because if I am correct it means that there is still no change in overall private-sector confidence in the euro zone. But that remains to be seen; I will return to this dissemination of Europe’s national accounts as soon as possible.

Euro-QE Would Be Big Mistake

How much time does the euro have left? That question was put on its edge last week when the Swiss National Bank decided it was no longer going to anchor the Swiss franc to the iceberg-bound euro ship. It was a wise decision for a number of reasons, the most compelling one being that the euro faces insurmountable challenges in the years ahead.

In fact, the Swiss decision was de facto a death spell for Europe’s currency union. More specifically, I noted that the euro

survived the Greek depression of 2012 by a razor-thin margin. Now it faces three very serious threats to its own survival. The first is the upcoming Greek elections, where anti-austerity, anti-euro, pro-Hugo Chavez Syriza looks like winners. Should they emerge victorious they could very well initiate a Greek exit from the currency union. The euro would survive that, and the German government has a contingency plan in place to stabilize the euro. But then there is the Greek government debt… Syriza has openly declared that they want “debt forgiveness” for governments throughout Europe. If the drachma is reintroduced, it will very likely plummet vs. the euro, making it exceptionally difficult for Syriza to repay its loans to the EU and the ECB. A default is within the realm of the probable; remember the Greek “debt write down” three years ago.

If all the problems for the euro were tied to Greece, the currency would indeed have a future. But there are so many other challenges ahead for the common currency that nothing short of a miracle – or unprecedented political manipulation – can keep it alive through the next three years.

The biggest short-term problem – Greece aside – is the pending announcement by the ECB of its own Quantitative Easing program. Reuters reports:

The European Central Bank will announce a 600 billion euro sovereign bond buying program this week, money market traders polled by Reuters say, but they also believe this will not be enough to bring inflation up to target. In the past two months traders have consistently predicted that the ECB would undertake quantitative easing, considered the bank’s final weapon against deflation. Eighteen of 20 in Monday’s poll said the bank would announce QE on Thursday.

This highly anticipated European QE program must be viewed in its proper macroeconomic context. It is going to be very different from the American QE program. For starters, the balance between liquidity supply and liquidity demand was very different in the U.S. economy than it is in the euro zone today. After its initial plunge into the Great Recession the American economy slowly but relentlessly worked its way back to growth again. Since climbing back to growth in 2010 the U.S. GDP has grown at a rate slightly above two percent per year. This is not something to throw a party over, but it has allowed the economy to absorb much of the liquidity that the Federal Reserve has pumped into the economy.

By being able to absorb liquidity, the U.S. economy has avoided getting caught in the liquidity trap. Growth rates have been good enough to motivate businesses to increase investment-driven credit demand; households have gotten back to buying homes and automobiles (car and truck sales in 2014 were almost as good as in pre-recession 2006).

The European economy does not absorb liquidity. It is stagnant, and has been so for three years now. The ECB has pushed its bank deposit rate to -0.2 percent, in other words it is punishing banks for not lending enough money to its customers. Despite this ample supply of credit there are no signs of a recovery in the euro zone, with GDP growth having reached the one-percent rate once in three years.

In other words, the positive outlook on the future that motivates American entrepreneurs and households to absorb liquidity through credit is notably absent in the European economy. When the ECB now evidently plans to pump even more liquidity out in the economy, it appears to not understand how significant this difference is between the euro zone and the United States.

Or, to be fair, with all its highly educated economists onboard, the ECB most certainly understands what role liquidity demand plays in an economy. Its pending decision to launch a QE program appears instead to be based in open ignorance of the lack of liquidity demand.

Which leads us to ask why they would ignore it.

The answer to this question is in the declared purpose of the QE program. If it is aimed at buying treasury bonds, then the QE program clearly is not designed to re-ignite the economy, an argument otherwise used. If QE is supposed to monetize government deficits, then its purpose is really to secure the continued existence of the European welfare state. If that is the purpose, then the only safe prediction is that there will be no end to QE before the welfare state ends.

That, in turn, means the ECB would be stuck monetizing deficits for the rest of the life of the euro. Which, under such circumstances, would be a relatively short period of time…

More on this on Thursday, when the ECB is expected to announce its QE program. Stay tuned.